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The plaintiff and appellant, Oquirrh Associates, submits 
this reply to the Brief of Appellee Frank Bernard and the Brief of 
Appellees Forthcoming Investments, Annette P. Cumming, Ian M. 
Cumming and Stephen D. Swindle (the "Forthcoming defendants").1 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The defendants and appellees claim that Oquirrh did not 
raise issue 5 below. They also argue that Oquirrh did not raise 
issue 3 below with respect to Forthcoming and, with respect to 
issue 6, never asserted that the covenant against waste ran with 
the land. Therefore, they argue, this court should not consider 
those issues. 
Issue 5 was whether Forthcoming became bound by the 
Oquirrh-Loiselle contract when it accepted a quitclaim deed from 
the Loiselles. Oquirrh's complaint alleged that the defendants 
were in default under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract. R. 4-5. 
1
 The Forthcoming defendants argue that the trial court 
correctly granted summary judgment to defendants Annette P. 
Cumming, Ian M. Cumming and Stephen D. Swindle. Oquirrh agrees 
that its only claim against Mr. Swindle was to clear title to the 
property and that it seeks no affirmative relief from him. See 
Record (MR.M) 669 & 800. Oquirrh also agrees that the Cummings' 
liability is based on their position as general partners of 
Forthcoming and therefore stands or falls with Forthcoming's 
liability. The Forthcoming defendants claim that Mr. Cumming has 
never been a general partner of Forthcoming. However, Mr. Cumming 
signed a notarized document in which he stated that he was a 
general partner of Forthcoming. R. 181-84. That was sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Mr. 
Cumming was a general partner of Forthcoming. See Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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Early in the case, the Forthcoming defendants moved for partial 
summary judgment on the grounds that the relevant documents showed 
they did not assume any liability to Oquirrh. See R. 308-09, 316. 
In response to that motion, Oquirrh argued that the quitclaim deed 
to Forthcoming from the Loiselles, who were in direct privity with 
Oquirrh, created a fact question as to whether Forthcoming had 
assumed any liability to Oquirrh. R. 298-99.2 Later, Oquirrh 
raised the issue again, in its motion to set aside the partial 
summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants. It expressly 
argued that Forthcoming was liable to Oquirrh under the Oquirrh-
Loiselle contract as the Loiselles' direct successor by reason of 
the Loiselle-Forthcoming quitclaim deed. R. 791-94. 
Issue 3 was whether Oquirrh acquired privity of contract 
with the defendants when it had writs of garnishment issued against 
them. Forthcoming responded to the writ of garnishment by claiming 
it owed Chad and the Loiselles nothing. R. 379-80. Oquirrh 
replied that Forthcoming was liable to Chad for breach of its 
covenants to Chad, including its covenant to perform the 
obligations Chad assumed under the Bernard-Brady contract. R. 452-
53. 
2
 Oquirrh withdrew its own motion for partial summary 
judgment on the grounds that the deed from the Loiselles to 
Forthcoming created factual disputes as to whether Forthcoming 
assumed any obligation under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract. R. 
456. 
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The defendants do not dispute that Oquirrh raised issue 
6 below, namely, whether subsequent purchasers of the property 
could be liable for waste. They claim that Oquirrh never argued 
below that subsequent purchasers could be liable for waste because 
the covenant against waste ran with the land. 
No record was made of the hearing on the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment, so there is no record of the issues 
raised at the hearing. Nevertheless, Oquirrh did allege below that 
subsequent purchasers could be liable for waste regardless of 
whether they had possession at the time of the waste. R. 658-59. 
It also alleged that the defendants could be liable to Oquirrh for 
their breach of the contractual covenants not to commit waste or 
allow waste to be committed on the property. See, e.g. , R. 655-62, 
719-25, 889. 
Oquirrh further alleged that Forthcoming could be liable 
to the Loiselles under the quitclaim deed from the Loiselles since 
the transaction touched and concerned the property and there was 
direct privity between Forthcoming and the Loiselles. R. 453. The 
privity between Forthcoming and the Loiselles was privity of 
estate, and the touch and concern requirement is a requirement for 
a covenant to run with the land. 
Oquirrh also argued below that this case was factually 
similar to Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). See R. 796-98. The court in Heiner held that the 
contract at issue there was an assignment rather than a sublease or 
- 3 -
subpurchase and that privity of estate existed between the parties, 
"thereby making the benefits and burdens of those covenants which 
run with the land enforceable directly by the . . . assignee 
against the other party." See 790 P.2d at 111-12 n.3. 
REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Forthcoming defendants claim that Oquirrh has 
mischaracterized the standard of review. They claim that, on an 
appeal from a grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate 
court will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the 
losing party only when the appellate court determines there is a 
genuine issue of material fact; otherwise, the grant of a summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness. 
To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must 
show that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact and (2) 
the undisputed material facts entitle it to a judgment as a matter 
of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The trial court's conclusions on 
both of these issues present questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness. See Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
However, because summary judgment denies a party the opportunity to 
present its case on the merits, in deciding whether the trial court 
correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
and that the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, an 
appellate court must review the facts and inferences to be drawn 
from them in the light most favorable to the appellant and construe 
any doubts or uncertainties in favor of the appellant. Atlas Corp. 
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v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 740 P.2d 262, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)• In other words, it must "view the facts in the light most 
likely to create factual questions" and construe them "against the 
party who bears the burden of proving that summary judgment was 
appropriate." Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Tel, & Tel, Co,. 844 P.2d 322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992), 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHETHER BERNARD ASSUMED THE LOISELLES' OBLIGATIONS 
TO OQUIRRH IS A DISPUTED QUESTION OF FACT. 
Oquirrh argued in its principal brief that defendant 
Frank P. Bernard's payments on the Loiselles' obligations under the 
Oquirrh-Loiselle contract raised a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Bernard had assumed the Loiselles' obligations to 
Oquirrh, despite the language in the Loiselle-Bernard contract that 
Bernard accepted only the obligations imposed by that agreement.3 
In response, Bernard argues that, in addition to the contract 
language, the fact that the Oquirrh-Loiselle and Loiselle-Bernard 
contracts contained different terms and that the Loiselles sold 
their beneficial interest in the Loiselle-Bernard contract without 
Bernard's knowledge or consent show that Bernard did not assume the 
3
 The fact that separate contracts were involved does not 
necessarily mean that Bernard did not assume the Loiselles' 
obligations to Oquirrh. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. , 790 P. 2d 
107, 115 n.12 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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Loiselles' obligations to Oquirrh. Bernard relied on some of the 
same evidence in opposing Oquirrh's first motion for partial 
summary judgment. At that time, however, Bernard conceded that 
there was f,a substantial fact question as to whether there is an 
implied assumption on the part of Bernard to perform the 
obligations of Loiselle under their contract with [Oquirrh]." R. 
221. Nothing has changed to alter that conclusion. 
In determining whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact, the appellate court considers only those facts 
properly cited to and supported by the record. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). It takes 
only one sworn statement to create a genuine issue of fact, 
precluding summary judgment. £d. (citing Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. 
v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). It does not 
matter that the evidence on one side may appear stronger than the 
evidence on the other side or may even be "compelling." Hardy v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 763 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah 1988) 
(citations omitted). There was evidence that Bernard made the 
Loiselles' payments to Oquirrh for over nine years. See R. 655. 
This evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Bernard assumed the Loiselles' obligations to Oquirrh and thus 
4
 Bernard also argues that he did not make payments to 
Oquirrh over the life of the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract. However, 
he cites no evidence in the record to support this assertion. The 
only evidence in the record that Oquirrh has found is that Bernard 
paid Oquirrh monthly until September 1988, when the payments to 
Oquirrh stopped. R. 655. 
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could be liable under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract. Cf. Kunzman 
v. Thorsen, 740 P.2d 754, 759-60 (Or. 1987) (actions of buyers' 
assignees in taking possession and making payments directly to the 
seller showed their intention to assume the buyers' obligations to 
the seller); Radlev v. Smith. 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P.2d 465, 466-67 
(1957) (where the assignee of the seller's interest in real estate 
contracts knew of the services required of the seller and initially 
accepted and performed those responsibilities, there was sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that she had assumed 
the seller's duties under the contracts). Bernard's arguments to 
the contrary are properly addressed to the finder of fact and do 
not justify summary judgment in his favor. 
II. 
THE WRITS OF GARNISHMENT GAVE OQUIRRH THE RIGHT 
TO ENFORCE THE DEFENDANTS' CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. 
Oquirrh had writs of garnishment issued against Bernard 
and Forthcoming. As Forthcoming recognizes, the writs gave Oquirrh 
the right to recover whatever debts the garnishees owed to 
Oquirrh's judgment debtors (the Loiselles and Chad). The 
defendants claim, however, that they owed no debts to their 
sellers. 
Bernard argues that he owed no debt to the Loiselles 
under the Loiselle-Bernard contract because the Loiselles had 
assigned their right to receive payments under the Loiselle-Bernard 
contract to Forthcoming by a quitclaim deed dated December 2, 1983. 
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However, the assignment merely conveyed the Loiselles' right to 
collect monies due under the Loiselle-Bernard contract. R. 427. 
The payment obligation was just one of the obligations Bernard, as 
buyer, owed the Loiselles under that contract. He also owed them 
duties to pay property taxes and other assessments on the property, 
not to commit or suffer to be committed any waste on the property 
and to maintain the property in good condition. These obligations 
were not assigned to Forthcoming. Oquirrh could therefore attach 
by writ of garnishment Bernard's liability to the Loiselles for 
breach of these obligations. 
Moreover, there is at least a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Forthcoming waived its right to receive payments 
under the Loiselle-Bernard contract, since Bernard continued to 
make payments directly to Oquirrh even after the assignment. See 
R. 655. The assignment from the Loiselles to Forthcoming therefore 
did not preclude Oquirrh from enforcing the Loiselles' contract 
claims against Bernard. 
Similarly, Forthcoming's alleged satisfaction of its 
financial obligations to Chad did not preclude Oquirrh from 
enforcing Chad's contractual claims against Forthcoming. The only 
obligation to Chad that Forthcoming satisfied was its obligation to 
pay Chad $52,817.63 for the assignment of Chad's interest under the 
Bernard-Brady contract. See R. 599. By paying Chad for the 
assignment, Forthcoming satisfied only one of its obligations to 
Chad. 
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The assignment from Chad to Forthcoming also required 
Forthcoming to "keep, observe and perform all of the terms, 
conditions and provisions of the [Bernard-Brady] Contract that are 
to be kept, observed and performed by [Chad]." R. 398 5 2.6. Chad 
was obligated to make the payments required by the Bernard-Brady 
contract. Forthcoming assumed that obligation. See R. 321, 430. 
Forthcoming's payment to Chad did not satisfy Chad's obligation to 
pay the purchase price under the Bernard-Brady contract. In fact, 
Forthcoming continued to make the payments Chad had assumed under 
the Bernard-Brady contract after it supposedly satisfied its 
obligations to Chad. In other words, Forthcoming's payment to Chad 
merely compensated Chad for its equity in the property. It did not 
satisfy any of Chad's obligations as buyer under the Bernard-Brady 
contract, including the obligation to make the monthly contract 
payments, to pay taxes and to maintain the property in good 
condition and not allow waste to be committed on the property. By 
defaulting on the buyers' obligations under the Bernard-Brady 
contract, Forthcoming incurred liability to Chad, which Oquirrh 
could garnish. 
The cases Forthcoming relies on are distinguishable. 
Those cases merely held that an unliquidated tort claim could not 
be litigated in a garnishment proceeding. See Auerbach Company v. 
Key Security Police, Inc., 680 P.2d 740, 742-43 (Utah 1984); Paul 
v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d 376, 379 (1957). Here, 
Oquirrh's derivative rights are contractual in nature. Oquirrh 
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stands in the shoes of the Loiselles and Chad, who had privity of 
contract with Bernard and Forthcoming, respectively. Oquirrh was 
therefore entitled to recover whatever amounts the Loiselles and 
Chad could recover under their contracts with Bernard and 
Forthcoming. Cf. Weir v. Galbraith. 376 P.2d 396, 401-02 (Ariz. 
1962) (garnishment was effective with respect to installments of a 
sales contract that were not yet due when the writ was served). 
III. 
THE ASSIGNMENT FROM CHAD TO OQUIRRH GAVE 
OQUIRRH RIGHTS AGAINST FORTHCOMING. 
Forthcoming claims that the assignment from Chad to 
Oquirrh did not give Oquirrh any claim against Forthcoming because 
Chad had no claim against Forthcoming at the time of the assignment 
since Forthcoming had discharged all its financial obligations to 
Chad. The only obligation Forthcoming had discharged was its 
obligation to pay Chad $52,817.63 to buy Chad's interest in the 
Bernard-Brady contract. Forthcoming also owed Chad a duty to 
perform the buyers' obligations under that contract. See supra pt. 
II. There was evidence that Forthcoming did not perform the 
buyers' obligation to make the monthly payments required under the 
Bernard-Brady contract. R. 655 |5 3-5, 806-07. There was also 
evidence that taxes had not been paid on the property, that the 
property had not been properly insured, see R. 104-06, and that the 
property had not been maintained, R. 655-56 ff 6-7, all as required 
by the contracts. In fact, Forthcoming had alleged as much in its 
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cross-claim against its assignee, First National Leasing. See R. 
53-55. Oguirrh, as the assignee of Chad's claims against 
Forthcoming, therefore had a claim against Forthcoming for its 
breach of the buyers' obligations under the Bernard-Brady contract. 
Chad did not have to wait for Bernard to assert a claim 
against Chad before Chad could assert a claim against Forthcoming. 
Chad, as Forthcoming's assignor, remained secondarily liable to 
perform the buyer's obligations under the Bernard-Brady contract. 
See, e.g., Kintner v. Harr, 408 P.2d 487, 497 (Mont. 1965). The 
relationship between Forthcoming and Chad was that of principal 
obligor and surety, 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 397 
(1975) , and a surety does not have to wait until the creditor sues 
him before he can maintain an action against the principal debtor 
to compel the principal to pay the debt, 74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship 
§ 174 (1974) . 
Moreover, Bernard in fact asserted a claim against Chad 
(and the other successors to the buyers' interest under the 
Bernard-Brady contract). See R. 134-37. 
Forthcoming claims that Oquirrh's foreclosure of the 
Oguirrh-Loiselle contract made it impossible for Bernard to convey 
title to the property and that Forthcoming was therefore discharged 
by Bernard's anticipatory breach of the contract.5 The reason 
5
 At the same time, Forthcoming also argues that a default 
under one contract does not excuse the buyer's obligation to make 
payments under another contract. See Brief of Appellees at 17-18. 
By Forthcoming's own reasoning, the Loiselles' default under their 
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Oquirrh foreclosed on the property was because the Loiselles had 
defaulted on their payments under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract. 
The evidence showed that those payments were being made by Bernard 
and that Bernard stopped making the payments because he was not 
being paid under the Bernard-Brady contract. See R. 655. 
Forthcoming had agreed to make the payments under the Bernard-Brady 
contract. See R. 398. Forthcoming's breach of its obligation 
caused Bernard to lose the ability to convey title to the property. 
Forthcoming cannot rely on its seller's alleged anticipatory breach 
to excuse its contractual obligations when it itself was 
responsible for the breach. Windward Partners v. Lopes, 640 P.2d 
872, 874 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982); Montana Bank of Circle, N.A. v. 
Ralph Meyers & Son, Inc., 769 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1989); Alk v. 
Lanini, 656 P.2d 367, 369 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 661 
P.2d 549 (Or. 1983). 
Forthcoming argues that it could not have caused 
Oquirrh's foreclosure because Oquirrh's only contract was with the 
Loiselles. The Loiselles were required to pay Oquirrh regardless 
of what happened under the other contracts. Therefore, Forthcoming 
argues, only the Loiselles' breach of contract was relevant. That 
is like arguing that one who rear-ends another car, starting a 
series of collisions, is not responsible for any injury to the 
driver of the last car. Forthcoming cites no law in support of its 
contract with Oquirrh, which caused Oquirrh's foreclosure, did not 
excuse Forthcoming's breach of the Bernard-Brady contract. 
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argument, Cf. Sortland v. Sandwick, 386 P.2d 130, 131-32 (Wash. 
1963) (driver who starts a chain reaction can be liable to other 
drivers in the chain). The evidence shows that Bernard lost his 
ability to convey title because he stopped making the monthly 
payments under the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract, that he stopped 
making the payments because he himself was not being paid under the 
Bernard-Brady contract and that Forthcoming had assumed the 
obligation to make the payments under the Bernard-Brady contract. 
Forthcoming was therefore responsible (with others in its chain of 
title) for Bernard's inability to convey clear title and therefore 
cannot use that inability to excuse its own nonperformance. Even 
if Oquirrh would not have a claim directly against Forthcoming for 
its default under the Bernard-Brady contract, Chad would, and 
Oguirrh succeeded to Chad's claims against Forthcoming when it took 
an assignment of those claims. Oquirrh therefore had a claim 
against Forthcoming for breach of the buyers' obligations under the 
Bernard-Brady contract. 
If Forthcoming thought there had been an anticipatory 
breach of the Bernard-Brady contract, it should have said something 
about it at the time. Hurwitz v. David K. Richards & Co., 2 0 Utah 
2d 232, 436 P.2d 794, 795 (1968). Forthcoming has not cited to any 
evidence that it declared an anticipatory breach of contract, sued 
for damages or tried to rescind the contract because of Bernard's 
alleged inability to convey good title. Forthcoming therefore lost 
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any claim it may have had of anticipatory breach. 436 P.2d at 795-
96. 
In any event, even if Bernard lost the ability to convey 
title when Oquirrh foreclosed on the property, the foreclosure did 
not make his performance absolutely impossible, just more 
difficult. See Petersen v. Intermountain Capital Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 
271, 508 P.2d 536, 538 (1973). Bernard was only required to convey 
title after all the payments under the Bernard-Brady contract had 
been made. Neves v. Wright. 638 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Utah 1981). 
Bernard could still acquire title to the property and thus perform 
his part of the bargain. Forthcoming's performance was therefore 
not excused. See Campbell v. Kerr. 618 P.2d 1237, 1242-43 (N.M. 
1980). 
IV. 
FORTHCOMING SUCCEEDED TO THE LOISELLES' INTEREST UNDER THE 
OQUIRRH-LOISELLE CONTRACT AND THUS BECAME BOUND BY THAT CONTRACT. 
The Oquirrh-Loiselle contract states that it is binding 
on "the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of 
the respective parties." R. 16. Forthcoming took a quitclaim deed 
from the Loiselles, giving Forthcoming all the Loiselles' "right, 
title and interest" in the property. R. 426-27. Forthcoming thus 
became a successor to the Loiselles and was bound by the Oquirrh-
Loiselle contract. Forthcoming argues that the quitclaim deed did 
not assign to Forthcoming the Loiselles' obligations to Oquirrh but 
only assigned the Loiselles' right to receive payments under the 
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Loiselle-Bernard contract. The quitclaim deed only limited 
Forthcoming's liability under the Loiselle-Bernard contract. It 
did not expressly limit Forthcoming's liability under the Oquirrh-
Loiselle contract. The Oquirrh-Loiselle contract makes that 
contract binding on the Loiselles' "heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors and assigns," and Forthcoming succeeded 
to the Loiselles' interest in the property when it took a quitclaim 
deed from the Loiselles. It was therefore bound by the Oquirrh-
Loiselle contract. 
V. 
A PARTY NOT IN POSSESSION CAN STILL 
BE LIABLE FOR WASTE COMMITTED ON THE PROPERTY. 
The defendants argue that they cannot be liable for any 
waste committed on the property because waste requires (1) some act 
constituting waste, (2) done by one legally in possession, and (3) 
to the prejudice of the estate or interest of another, see Hansen 
v. Green River Group. 748 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ,6 
and the defendants were not legally in possession of the property 
when any waste was committed. 
Oquirrh concedes that there is no evidence that either 
Bernard or Forthcoming personally committed any waste on the 
property or that any waste was committed between March 1, 1919, and 
November 15, 1979, while Bernard had actual possession of the 
6
 For its definition of waste, Hansen relied on Jowdy v. 
Guerin, 457 P.2d 745, 748 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), discussed infra. 
See 748 P.2d at 1106. 
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property, or between December 22, 1983, and March 30, 1988, while 
Forthcoming had actual possession of the property. That does not 
necessarily mean, however, that Bernard and Forthcoming cannot be 
liable for waste committed on the property. 
The contractual covenant against waste was broader than 
a mere covenant not to commit waste. The buyers agreed neither to 
commit nor "suffer to be committed any waste" on the property and 
to "maintain said premises in good condition." R. 483 f 15; 708 f 
15; 715 J 15. By allowing the property to be wasted by 
subpurchasers, the defendants breached those covenants. 
Although an action for waste is generally an action by an 
out-of-possession owner against an offending party in possession, 
a common law waste action may be maintained against a non-
possessory defendant. Smith v. Cap Concrete, 184 Cal. Rptr. 308, 
311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
In Wilson v. Kruse, 258 P.2d 112 (Or. 1953), for example, 
a lessor brought an action for waste against its tenant. The 
tenant had sublet the entire premises to a third party, "which 
alone occupied the premises during the entire term of the lease" 
and had committed whatever waste was committed on the property. 
The court upheld a judgment for waste against the tenant, even 
though it was not in possession when the waste was committed.7 
7
 The court modified the award to eliminate treble damages 
against the tenant. 
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This case is similar to two cases arising in Arizona— 
Jowdy v. Guerinr 457 P.2d 745 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) , cited with 
approval in Hansen v. Green River Group. 748 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), and Micuda v. McDonald fin re Evergreen Ventures). 
147 Bankr. 751 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992). 
In Jowdy. a small home was sold on contract. The Jowdys 
took an assignment of the buyer's interest in the contract but did 
not live in the home. They left the property empty, and someone 
trashed it. Mrs. Guerin, the assignee of the original seller, 
brought an action against the Jowdys for waste. The court first 
recognized that an action for waste requires (1) "an act 
constituting waste," (2) "done by one legally in possession" of the 
property, (3) "to the prejudice of the estate or interest" of 
another in the property. 457 P.2d at 748. The court found that 
the first two elements were easily met: 
The facts are undisputed that the defendants completely 
divorced themselves from any concern over the property 
and did not make any plans for its protection. We 
believe this act clearly amounts to evidence upon which 
the trier of fact can find negligence required to 
constitute permissive waste since during the time of the 
waste defendants had the possessory rights to the 
property. 
Id. The fact that the defendants never took actual possession of 
the property was not dispositive: 
Although the evidence does not show the actual cause of 
the deterioration of the house, it does reflect that the 
defendants did not provide for its protection in any 
manner whatever while in constructive possession and that 
they have failed to show that the deterioration was 
caused by anything other than their negligence. 
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Id. The court held that the assignees of a vendee could be 
responsible for waste "at least in a case such as this where at all 
times the defendants were in constructive possession of the 
property and the successor of the vendor's interest did not have 
notice that the property was being abandoned and neglected.11 Id. 
at 749. 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Arizona recently followed Jowdy in a case even more on point, 
Micuda v. McDonald fin re Evergreen Ventures), 147 Bankr. 751 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992). The debtor in that case was Evergreen 
Ventures, a limited partnership whose general partner was John 
Micuda. Evergreen bought an apartment complex on contract. The 
sellers had taken good care of the property. Evergreen owned the 
property for about six years, during which time it allowed the 
property to deteriorate markedly. In June 1989, Evergreen sold the 
property to a third party, a Mr. Krishnan, who allowed further 
deterioration of the property. Evergreen recovered the property 
from Krishnan in September 1989 and filed for bankruptcy in 
November 1989. The original sellers obtained relief from the 
automatic stay, held a foreclosure sale and regained possession of 
the property. They then spent substantial sums to restore the 
property. An action was brought in the bankruptcy case to 
determine Micuda's liability to the original sellers. 
The court held Micuda liable for the full cost of 
restoring the property, despite the fact that some of the waste 
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occurred while Krishnan, Evergreen's successor, owned the property. 
The court noted that the first two elements of a cause of action 
for waste were easily established: First, "[t]here was an act 
constituting permissive waste: Evergreen failed to exercise 
ordinary care in the preservation of the complex," and, second, 
"[t]hese omissions occurred while Evergreen was legally in 
possession of the premises," despite the fact that some of the 
omissions occurred while Krishnan, Evergreen's buyer, owned the 
property. 147 Bankr. at 756. 
This case is indistinguishable from Micuda. Oquirrh sold 
the property in 1977. In late March 1988 Forthcoming assigned its 
interest in the property to First National Leasing. By July 1988 
First National had neglected the property and stopped making 
payments on it. R. 104 J 4. By January, Oquirrh had to bring an 
action to foreclose on the property and have a receiver appointed. 
R. 2-8. Oquirrh "sold a . . . project that was well managed and in 
good condition. [It] received a set of run-down units in very poor 
condition following [Bernard's and Forthcoming's] ownership of the 
premises." See Micuda, 147 Bankr. at 756. Bernard and Forthcoming 
are therefore liable for the waste committed on the property. A 
party ought not to be able to escape its duty not to commit or 
allow waste on the property simply by giving possession of the 
property to an irresponsible third party that will waste the 
property. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the brief of appellant and in 
this reply, the district court's rulings should be reversed to the 
extent they barred Oguirrh from pursuing its claims against 
subsequent purchasers of the property for allowing waste to be 
committed on the property and from pursuing contract claims against 
Bernard and Forthcoming based on the writs of garnishment and 
assignment of Chad's claims, 
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